Rationality, Economics and Violence: A Social and Environmental Philosophy by Kenneth Wilson

The previous chapter discussed aspects of scientific rationality. This chapter continues the theme of rationality by discussing its economic form. The main concern is that the concept of rationality involved in laissez-faire capitalism turns out to be less than rational. Let me give an example of how economic “rationality” can be found wanting. This example relies on an interpretation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. As Joel E. Cohen notes,
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Rationality and Science: A Social and Environmental Philosophy by Kenneth Wilson

This chapter concerns itself with rationality in its scientific guise. Typically science is often taken to be the paradigm instance of rationality in the modern period. In addition to science being a key representative of reason, it has also become separated from religion, the historical locus of thought about values and ethics.
My concern in this chapter lies in two areas. The first of these lies in the distinction between fact and value, science and ethics, and the second, with the notion that science is ethically neutral. In the discussion of these issues I aim to show that there are confusions and inconsistencies involved which force one to reconsider the status of science and the sense in which it is rational. Indeed I am at pains to counter a tendency which sees scientific facts as somehow determining what our values ought to be, when in actuality scientific facts provide no such solutions. Read more…

Rationality, Religion and Modernity Part B: A Social and Environmental Philosophy by Kenneth Wilson

I now turn to a detailed discussion of the alleged legacy of the middle ages in the context of the work of Hans Blumenberg. Blumenberg begins his monograph The Legitimacy of the Modern Age with a discussion of the meaning of secularisation. Blumenberg is interested in the status of the modern age. This obviously leads to a contrast with pre-modern ages, in this case the Christianity of the middle ages.

When one contrasts the middle ages with the modern era it seems clear that our world has undergone a process of secularisation, which Blumenberg points out is incomplete, and that this is a condition of our being able to discuss it at all.[7] In other words, if the process of secularisation had been completed, then perhaps it would not be on the horizon of thought.
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A Social and Environmental Philosophy: The Historical Dimension of Action by Kenneth Wilson

This is the last part of the first section on Action of Kenneth Wilson’s thesis “A Social and Environmental Philosophy”

The last two chapters set out to establish a biospheric and social context for the agent. This chapter develops this sense of context for the agent by arguing for, and describing the nature of, the agent’s historical situatedness. Thus I argue against those, such as John Elster,[1] who take the position that the historical influence on the agent in the present is to be ignored. This position is sometimes referred to as ‘methodological presentism’.
This chapter therefore examines an aspect of the temporality of the agent. The importance of this discussion for the crisis of modernity lies in the characteristic tendency of modernity to jettison the past. This is evidenced in revolutionary, “year zero” types of political change, in which the instigators believe that a truly fresh start can be made, as if history had never happened and as if its influence can be ignored. Read more…

A Social and Environmental Philosophy: The Individual and Collective Dimension of Action by Kenneth Wilson

This is the second part of the first section on Action of Kenneth Wilson’s thesis “A Social and Environmental Philosophy”

Let me open with an anecdote which briefly illustrates the position taken in this chapter. As an undergraduate I attended a laboratory session in which students were invited to inspect a human brain. It was a sobering experience. On the lab bench in a tray was the brain removed from its skull and severed from its body. Read more…

A Social and Environmental Philosophy: Human Action in the Biosphere by Kenneth Wilson

This is the first part of the first section [Action] of Kenneth Wilson’s thesis “A Social and Environmental Philosophy”

As G. H. von Wright comments, “The notion of a human act is related to the notion of an event, i.e. a change in the world.”[1] An action then is a manifestation of the cause-effect relations which constitute what it is to be a human being. What is more, any action is undertaken in relation to some external state of affairs, whether these involve other people, other living entities or processes, or simply the inanimate context.
Von Wright also comments that, “To act is, in a sense, to interfere with “the course of nature.””[2] This quotation clearly points the way to the role of intention. Intention is connected to the concepts of free will and the deliberate choice of some course of action. Therefore the use of the concept as valid is underpinned by a position in the opposition between free will and determinism. While I accept the validity of intention as a concept and thus support the existence of free will, I nevertheless see a role for determined behaviour. Read more…