The social world is accumulated history, and if it is not to be reduced to a discontinuous series of instantaneous mechanical equilibria between agents who are treated as interchangeable particles, one must reintroduce into it the notion of capital and with it, accumulation and all its effects. Capital is accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its 'incorporated,' embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of ranked or living labor. It is a vis in re, a force inscribed in objective or subjective structures, but it is also a lex in re, the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world. It is what makes the games of society—not least, the economic game—something other than what makes the games of society. At a given moment in time, and not only in the one form recognized by economic theory. Economic theory has allowed to be foisted upon it a definition of the economy of practices which is the historical invention of capitalism; and by reducing the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is objectively and subjectively oriented toward the maximization of profit, i.e., (economically) self-interested, it has implicitly defined the other forms of exchange as noneconomic, and therefore disinterested. In particular, it defines as disinterested those forms of exchange which ensure the transubstantiation whereby the most material forms of capital—those which are economic in the restricted sense—can present themselves in the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa. Interest, in the restricted sense it is given in economic theory, cannot be produced without producing its negative counterpart, disinterestedness. The class of practices whose explicit purpose is to maximize monetary profit cannot be defined as such without producing the purposeless finitude of cultural or artistic practices and their products; the world of bourgeois man, with his double-entry accounting, cannot be invented without producing the pure, perfect universe of the artist and the intellectual and the gratuitous activities of art-for-art’s sake. Capital is accumulative and pure theory. In other words, the constitution of a science of mercantile relationships which, inasmuch as it takes for granted the very foundations of the order it claims to analyze—private property, profit, wage labor, etc.—is not even a science of the field of economic production, has prevented the constitution of a general science of the economy of practices, which would treat mercantile exchange as a particular case of exchange in all its forms.

It is in fact impossible to account for the structure and functioning of the social world unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognized by economic theory. Economic theory has allowed to be foisted upon it a definition of the economy of practices which is the historical invention of capitalism; and by reducing the universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange, which is objectively and subjectively oriented toward the maximization of profit, i.e., (economically) self-interested, it has implicitly defined the other forms of exchange as noneconomic, and therefore disinterested. In particular, it defines as disinterested those forms of exchange which ensure the transubstantiation whereby the most material forms of capital—those which are economic in the restricted sense—can present themselves in the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa. Interest, in the restricted sense it is given in economic theory, cannot be produced without producing its negative counterpart, disinterestedness. The class of practices whose explicit purpose is to maximize monetary profit cannot be defined as such without producing the purposeless finitude of cultural or artistic practices and their products; the world of bourgeois man, with his double-entry accounting, cannot be invented without producing the pure, perfect universe of the artist and the intellectual and the gratuitous activities of art-for-art’s sake. Capital is accumulative and pure theory. In other words, the constitution of a science of mercantile relationships which, inasmuch as it takes for granted the very foundations of the order it claims to analyze—private property, profit, wage labor, etc.—is not even a science of the field of economic production, has prevented the constitution of a general science of the economy of practices, which would treat mercantile exchange as a particular case of exchange in all its forms.

It is remarkable that the practices and assets thus salvaged from the icy water of egotistical calculation (and from science) are the virtual monopoly of the dominant class—as if it should have been able to reduce everything to economics only because the reduction on which that discipline is based protects from sacrilegious reduction everything which needs to be protected. If economics deals only with practices that have narrowly economic interest as their principle and only with goods that are directly convertible into money (which makes them quantifiable), then the universe of bourgeois production and exchange becomes an exception and can see itself and present itself as a realm of disinterestedness. As everyone knows, priceless things have their price, and the extreme difficulty of converting certain practices and certain objects into money is only due to the fact that this conversion is refused in the very intention that produces them, which is nothing other than the denial (Verneinung) of the economy. A general science of the economy of practices, capable of reappropriating the totality of the practices which, although certainly economic in their own right, cannot be socially recognized as economic, and which can be performed only at the cost of a whole labor of dissimulation or, more precisely, euphemization, must endeavor to grasp capital and profit in all their forms and to establish the laws whereby the different types of capital (or power, which amounts to the same thing) change into one another.

Depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of the more or less expensive transformations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question, capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations ('connections'), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility.

Cultural Capital

Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the institutionalized state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee.

The reader should not be misled by the somewhat peremptory air which the effort at axiomatization may give to my argument. The notion of cultural capital initially presented itself to me, in the course of research, as a theoretical hypothesis which made it possible to explain the unequal scholastic achievement of children originating from the different social classes by relating academic success, i.e., the specific profits which children from the different classes and class fractions can obtain in the academic market, to the distribution of educational qualifications. This starting point implies a break with the presuppositions inherent both in the commonsense view, which sees academic success or failure as an effect of natural aptitudes, and in human capital theories. Economists might seem to deserve credit for explicitly raising the question of the relationship between the rates of profit on educational
investment and on economic investment (and its evolution). But their measurement of the yield from scholastic investment takes account only of monetary investments and profits, or those directly convertible into money, such as the costs of schooling and the cash equivalent of time devoted to study; they are unable to explain the different proportions of their resources which different agents or different social classes allocate to economic investment and cultural investment because they fail to take systematic account of the structure of the differential chances of profit which the various markets offer to the agents or classes as a function of the volume and the composition of their assets (see esp. Becker 1964a). Furthermore, because they neglect to relate scholastic investment strategies to the whole set of educational strategies and to the system of reproduction strategies, they inevitably, by a necessary paradox, let slip the best hidden and socially most determinant educational investment, namely, the domestic transmission of cultural capital. Their studies of the relationship between academic ability and academic achievement show that they are unaware that ability or talent is itself the product of an investment of time and cultural capital (Becker 1964a: 63-6). Not surprisingly, when endeavoring to evaluate the profits of scholastic investment, they can only consider the profitability of educational expenditure for society as a whole, the 'social rate of return,' or the 'social gain of education as measured by its effects on national productivity' (Becker 1964a: 121, 155). This typically functionalist definition of the functions of education ignores the contribution which the educational system makes to the reproduction of the social structure by sanctioning the hereditary transmission of cultural capital.

From the very beginning, a definition of human capital, despite its humanistic connotations, does not move beyond economism and ignores, inter alia, the fact that the scholastic yield, from educational action depends on the cultural capital previously invested by the family. Moreover, the economic and social yield of the educational qualification depends on the social capital, again inherited, which can be used to back it up.

THE EMBODIED STATE
Most of the properties of cultural capital can be deduced from the fact that, in its fundamental state, it is linked to the body and presupposes embodiment. The accumulation of cultural capital in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of what is called culture, cultures, presupposes a process of embodiment, incorporation, which, insofar as it implies a labor of inculcation and assimilation, costs time, time which must be invested personally by the investor. Like the acquisition of a muscular physique or a suntan, it cannot be done at second hand (so that all effects of delegation are ruled out).

The work of acquisition is work on oneself (self-improvement), an effort that presupposes a personal cost (‘on paie la personne, as we say in French), an investment, above all of time, and cultural capital (Becker 1964a: 121, 155), This typically functionalist definition of the functions of education ignores the contribution which the educational system makes to the reproduction of the social structure by sanctioning the hereditary transmission of cultural capital.

It can immediately be seen that the link between economic and cultural capital is established through the mediation of the time needed for acquisition. Differences in the cultural capital possessed by the family imply differences in the age at which the work of transmission and acquisition begins— the passing of time being the full time being harnessed to maximum cultural capital—and then in the capacity, thus defined, to satisfy the specifically cultural demands of a prolonged process of acquisition. Furthermore, and in correlation with this, the length of time for which a given individual can prolong his acquisition process depends on the
length of time for which his family can provide him with free time, i.e., time free from economic necessity, which is the precondition for the initial accumulation (time which can be evaluated as a handicap to be made up).

THE OBJECTIFIED STATE

Cultural capital, in the objectified state, has a number of properties which are defined only in the relationship with cultural capital in its embodied form. The cultural capital objectified in material objects and media, such as writings, paintings, monuments, instruments, etc., is transmissible in its materiality. A collection of paintings, for example, can be transmitted as well as economic capital (if not better, because the capital transfer is more disguised). But what is transmissible is legal ownership and not (or not necessarily) what constitutes the precondition for specific appropriation, namely, the possession of the means of 'consuming' a painting or using a machine, which, being nothing other than embodied capital, are subject to the same laws of fee.

Thus cultural goods can be appropriated both materially—which presupposes economic capital—and symbolically—which presupposes cultural capital. It follows that the owner of the means of production must find a way of appropriating either the embodied capital which is the possession of the agents, the services of the holders of this capital. To possess the machines, he only needs economic capital; to appropriate them and use them in accordance with their specific purpose (defined by the cultural capital, of scientific or technical type, incorporated in them), he must have access to embodied capital, either in person or by proxy. This is no doubt the basis of the ambiguous status of cadres (executives and possessors (in the strictly economic sense) who draw their profit from their own cultural capital, which is constantly required to prove its value, in terms of cultural capital, of the holder of a given qualification by guaranteeing the monetary value of a given academic qualification. This product of the conversion of economic capital into cultural capital establishes the value, in terms of cultural capital, of the holder of a given qualification relative to other qualification holders and, by the same token, the monetary value for which it can be exchanged on the labor market (academic investment has no meaning unless a minimum degree of reversibility is involved). This means that although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, this means that, although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, this means that, although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, this means that, although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, this means that, although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, this means that, although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, this means that, although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, this means that, although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, this means that, although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, this means that, although it is relatively irreducible to the economic and cultural capital possessed by a given agent, or even by the whole set of agents to whom he is connected, this means that, although it is relatively irr...
implied in concentration and to secure the profits of membership—material profits, such as all the types of services accruing from useful relationships, and symbolic profits, such as those derived from association with a rare, prestigious group.

The existence of a network of connections is not a natural given, or even a social given, constituted once and for all by an initial act of institution, represented, in the case of the family group, by the genealogical definition of kinship relations, which is the characteristic of a social formation. It is the product of an endless effort at institution, of which institution rites—or often wrongly described as rites of passage—mark the essential moments and which is necessary in order to produce and reproduce lasting, useful relationships that can secure material or symbolic profits (see Bourdieu 1982). In other words, the network of relationships is the product of investment strategies, individual or collective, consciously or unconsciously aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short or long term, i.e., at transforming contingent relations, such as those of neighborhood, the workplace, or even kinship, into relationships that become at least obligatory, if not neces-sarily, in order to control these exchanges, while remaining within the logic of laissez-faire, through all the institutions which are designed to favor legitimate exchanges and exclude illegitimate ones by producing occasions (rallies, cruises, hunts, parties, receptions, etc.), places (smart neighborhoods, select schools, clubs, etc.), or practices (smart sports, parlor games, cultural ceremonies, etc.) which bring together, in a seemingly fortuitous way, individuals as homogeneous as possible in all the pertinent respects in terms of the existence and persistence of the group.

The reproduction of social capital presupposes an unbroken series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed. This work, which implies expenditure of time and energy and so, directly or indirectly, of economic capital, is not profitable or even conceivable unless one invests in it a specific competence (knowledge of genealogy, the skill of recognizing and acting on it), the recognition of which is endlessly reproduced and exchanged between the members of his group, the liegemen, and also the personality cult or the identification of parties, which is clearly seen when Shakespeare calls Cleopatra 'Egypt' or the King of France 'France,' just as Raciné calls Pyrrhus 'Epirus.' It is by him, his name, the difference it proclaims, that the members of his group, the liegemen, recognize and claim their superiority distinguishing the obligations and authorizing the recognized spokesmen to shield the group as a whole from discredit by expelling or excommunicating the embarrassing individuals.

If the internal competition for the monopoly of legitimate representation of the group is to threaten the conservation and accumulation of capital, the worth of the group to the person who is the object of it is much greater to the extent that the person who is the object of it is richly endowed with capital (mainly social, but also cultural and even economic capital), the possessors of an inherited social capital, symbolized by a great name, are able to transform all institutional relationships into last- ing connections. They are sought after for their social capital and, because they are well known, are worthy of being known ('I know him well!'); they do not need to 'make the acquaintance' of all their 'acquaintances'; they are known to more people than they know, and their work of sociability, when it is exerted, is highly productive.

Every group has its more or less institutionalized forms of delegation, which enable it to concentrate the totality of its social capital, which is the basis of the existence of the group (a family or a nation, of course, but also an association or a party), in the hands of a single agent or a small group of agents and to mandate this plenipotentiary, charged with

| Conversions |
The different types of capital can be derived from economic capital, but only at the cost of a more or less great effort of transformation,
which is needed to produce the type of power
effective in the field in question. For example,
there are some goods and services to which
economic capital gives immediate access,
without secondary costs; others can be
obtained only by virtue of a social capital
of relationships (or social obligations) which
cannot act instantaneously, at the appropriate
moment, unless they have been established
and maintained for a long time, as if for their
own sake, and the ability to maintain that
period of use, i.e., at the cost of an investment in sociabil-
ity which is necessarily long-term because the
time lag is one of the factors of the trans-
formation of a pure and simple debt into that
recognition of nonspecific indebtedness
which is called gratitude. 15 In contrast to the
cynical but also economical transparency of
economic exchange, in which equivalents
change hands in the same instant, the essential
ambiguity of social exchange, which presup-
poses misrecognition, in other words, a form of
faith and of bad faith (in the sense of self-
deception), presumes a much more subtle
economy of time.

So it has to be posited simultaneously that
economic capital is at the root of all the other
types of capital, and that the transformed,
disguised forms of economic capital, never
entirely reducible to that definition, produce
their most specific effects only to the extent
that they conceal (not least from their posses-
sors) the fact that economic capital is at their
root, in other words—but only in the last
analysis—at the root of their effects. The real
type of capital, the conversions from one type to another, and the law of
conservation which governs them cannot be
understood unless two opposing but equally
partial views are superseded: on the one hand,
economicism, which, on the grounds that every
type of capital is reducible in the last analysis
to economic capital, ignores what makes the
specific efficacy of the other types of capital,
and on the other hand, semiosis (nowa-
days represented by structuralism, symbolic
interactionism, or ethnomet hodology), which
reduces social exchanges to phenomena of
communication and ignores the brutal fact of
utility to economic capital. 16

In accordance with a principle which is the
equivalent of the principle of the conservation
of energy, profits in one area are necessarily
paid for by costs in another (so that a concept
wastage has no meaning in a general sci-
ence of the economy of practices). The uni-
versal equivalent, the measure of all equiv-
alences, is nothing other than labor-time (in the
widest sense); and the conservation of social
energy through all its conversions is verified
if, in each case, one takes into account both the
labor-time accumulated in the form of capital
and the labor-time needed to transform it
from one type into another.

It has been seen, for example, that the trans-
formation into social capital presupposes a specific labor, i.e., an
apparently gratuitous expenditure of time,
attention, care, concern, which, as is seen in
the endeavor to personalize a gift, has the
effect of transfiguring the purely monetary
import of the exchange and, by the same
token, the very meaning of the exchange.

From a narrowly economic standpoint, this
effort is bound to be seen as pure wastage, but in
the terms of the logic of social exchanges, it
is a solid investment, the profits of which will
appear, in the long run, in monetary or other
form. Similarly, if the best measure of cultural
capital is undoubtedly the amount of time
devoted to acquiring it, this is because the
transformation of economic capital into cul-
tural capital presupposes a specific labor—
that is, a form of personal time that is made possible by possession of
economic capital. More precisely, it is because
the cultural capital that is effectively transmitted
within the family itself depends not only
on the quantity of cultural capital, itself accu-
mulated by spending time, but the domestic
group possesses, but also on the usable time
(partially in the form of the mother's free-
time) available to it (by virtue of its eco-
nomic capital, which enables it to purchase the time
of others) to the emission of their
labors—pure and simple—that makes possible the
capital and to delay entry into the labor market
through prolonged schooling, a credit which
pays off, if at all, only in the very long term. 17

The convertibility of the different types of
capital is the basis of the strategies aimed at
ensuring the reproduction of capital (and the
position occupied in social space) by means of
the conversions least costly in terms of con-
version work and of the losses inherent in the
conversion itself (in a given state of the social
system). 18 And economic capital itself poses quite different
problems of reproduction, depending on the
particular form of capital. Thus, according
to the Marxist (1970), the productivity of com-
mercial capital, which gives immediate economic
power and favors transmission, also makes it
more vulnerable than landed property (for
real estate) and does not favor the estab-
ishment of long-lasting dynasties.

Because the question of the arbitrariness
of appropriation arises most sharply in the
process of transmission—particularly at the
time of succession, a critical moment for all
power—and every reproduction strategy is at the
same time a legitimating strategy aimed at
consecrating both an exclusive appropriation
and its reproduction. When the hermeneutic
critique, which aims to weaken the dominant
class through the principle of its perpetuation
by bringing light the arbitrariness of the
entitlements transmitted and of their trans-
mission (such as the Enlightenment philosophy directed, in the
birth of the Enlightenment, against the arbitrariness
of mechanisms intended for institutionalized
institutions, and so on) aims at controlling the official, direct
transmission of power and privileges, the
holders of capital have an ever greater interest
in resorting to reproduction strategies capable
of ensuring better disguised transmission,
but at the cost of greater loss of capital, by
exploiting the convertibility of the types of
capital. Thus the more the official
management of capital is prevented or hindered, the more
the effects of the clandestine circulation
of capital in the form of cultural capital
become determinant in the reproduction of
the social structure. As an instrument of
reproduction capable of disguising the
function, the scope of the educational system
tends to increase, and together with this
increase is the unification of the market in
social qualifications which gives richer
to occupy rare positions.

Notes
1. This inertia, entailed by the tendency of the
structures of capital to reproduce themselves
in institutions or in dispositions adapted to the
structures of which they are the product, is, of
course, reinforced by a specifically political
action of concerned conservation, i.e.,
demobilization and politicalization. The
latter tends to keep the dominated groups in the
state of a practical group, united only by the
capitalization of their dispositions and
determined to fight, as an aggregate repeatedly performing different individual
acts, such as consumer or electoral choice.

2. These are exchanges between members of
different fractions of the dominant class,
possessing different types of capital. These
take place, then, in the form of gift exchange
dignifying themselves with the
The Forms of Capital

most decorous names that can be found (hon- 
oria, emoluments, etc.) to matrimonial 
exchanges, the prime example of a transac-
tion that is thoroughly unprofitable is the 
marriage. Although the legal and the laws 
of the educational market. Dispositions 
that are given a negative value in the educa-
tional market may receive very high value in 
other markets—social and economic— in the 
relationships internal to the class.

In a relatively undifferentiated society, 
in which access to the means of appropriating 
the cultural heritage is very equally distributed, 
embodied culture does not function as cultural 
capital, i.e., as a means of acquiring exclusive 
advantages.

What I call the generalized Arrow effect, i.e., 
the fact that all cultural goods—paintings, 
monuments, machines, and any objects 
shaped by man, particularly all those which 
behave through a process of sedimentation— 
earn an educative effect by their mere existence, 
is no doubt one of the structural factors behind 
the 'schooling explosion,' in the sense that a 
market (Becker 1964a).

3. Symbolic capital, that is to say, capital— 
in whatever form—is never as it is represented, 
and apprehended symbolically, in a relation-
ship of knowledge or, more precisely, of rec-
ognition and recognition, presupposes the 
intervention of the habitus, as a socially con-
stituted cognitive capacity.

4. When talking about concepts for their own 
sake, I do not mean to insinuate that one 
always runs the risk of being both 
schematic and formal, i.e., theoretical in 
the most usual and most usually approved sense of 
the word.

5. This proposition implies no recognition of the 
value of scholastic verdicts; it merely registers 
the relationship which exists in reality between 
a capital and the law of the educational market. Dispositions 
that are given a negative value in the educa-
tional market may receive very high value in 
other markets—social and economic— in the 
relationships internal to the class.

6. In a relatively undifferentiated society, 
in which access to the means of appropriating 
the cultural heritage is very equally distributed, 
embodied culture does not function as cultural 
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To understand the attractiveness of this pair 
of antagonistic positions which serve as each 
other's allies, one would need to analyze the 
unconscious profits and the profits of uncon-
sciousness, the value of scholastic verdicts 
and future resources.

12. Neighborhood relationships may, of course, 
intended to be seen (from below), and to inter-
pret generous or charitable conduct as 'calcu-
lated acts of class appeasement.' This naive 
mythology takes place, as if it were not 
perceived or defined as such by the contract-
ors. It is remarkable that the apparent 
extension of economic theory beyond the 
limits of discipline have left intact the asylum of the sacred, apart from a 
few sacrilegious incursions. Gary S. Becker, 
for example, who was one of the first to take 
excisive effect most radically and 
showing (bodily or verbal manners, tastes, 
etc.) or the relationships established with 
fellow students can yield in the matrimonial 
market (Becker 1964a).

3. Symbolic capital, that is to say, capital— 
in whatever form—is never as it is represented, 
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ognition and recognition, presupposes the 
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tional market may receive very high value in 
other markets—social and economic— in the 
relationships internal to the class.

6. In a relatively undifferentiated society, 
in which access to the means of appropriating 
the cultural heritage is very equally distributed, 
embodied culture does not function as cultural 
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7. What I call the generalized Arrow effect, i.e., 
the fact that all cultural goods—paintings, 
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earn an educative effect by their mere existence, 
is no doubt one of the structural factors behind 
the 'schooling explosion,' in the sense that a 
market (Becker 1964a).
other people's time (in the form of services). It may take the form either of increased spare time, secured by reducing the time consumed in activities directly channelled toward producing the means of reproducing the existence of the domestic group, or of more intense use of the time so consumed, by recourse to other people's labor or to devices and methods which are available only to those who have spent time learning how to use them and which (like better transport or living close to the place of work) make it possible to save time. (This is in contrast to the cash savings of the poor, which are paid for in time—do-it-yourself, bargain hunting, etc.) None of this is true of mere economic capital; it is possession of cultural capital that makes it possible to derive greater profit not only from labor-time, but also from spare time, and so to increase both economic and cultural capital.

21. It goes without saying that the dominant fractions, who tend to place ever greater emphasis on educational investment, within an overall strategy of asset diversification and of investments aimed at combining security with high yield, have all sorts of ways of evading scholastic verdicts. The direct transmission of economic capital remains one of the principal means of reproduction, and the effect of social capital ('a helping hand,' 'string-pulling,' the 'old boy network') tends to correct the effect of academic sanctions. Educational qualifications never function perfectly as currency. They are never entirely separable from their holders: their value rises in proportion to the value of their bearer, especially in the least rigid areas of the social structure.

References


Class and Pedagogies: Visible and Invisible

Basil Bernstein

I shall examine some of the assumptions and the cultural context of a particular form of preschool/infant school pedagogy, a form which has at least the following characteris-

1. Where the control of the teacher over the child is implicit rather than explicit.
2. Where, ideally, the teacher arranges the context within which the child is expected to re-arrange and explore.
3. Where within this arranged context, the child apparently has wide powers over what he selects, over how he structures, and over the time scale of his activities.
4. Where the child apparently regulates his own movements and social relationships.
5. Where there is a reduced emphasis upon the transmission and acquisition of specific skills (see Note 1).
6. Where the criteria for evaluating the pedagogy are multiple and diffuse and so not easily measured.

Invisible Pedagogy and Infant Education

One can characterise this pedagogy as an invisible pedagogy. In terms of the concepts of classification and frame, the pedagogy is realised through weak classification and weak frames. Visible pedagogies are realised through strong classification and strong frames. The basic difference between visible and invisible pedagogies is in the manner in which criteria are transmitted and in the degree of specificity of the criteria. The more implicit the manner of transmission and the more diffuse the criteria the more invisible the pedagogy; the more specific the criteria, the more explicit the manner of their transmission, the more visible the pedagogy. These definitions will be extended later in the paper. If the pedagogy is invisible, what aspects of the child have high visibility for the teacher? I suggest two aspects. The first arises out of an inference the teacher makes from the child's ongoing behaviour about the developmental stage of the child. This inference is then referred to a concept of readiness. The second aspect of the child refers to his external behaviour and is conceptualised by the teacher as busyness. The child should be busy doing things. These inner (readiness) and outer (busyness) aspects of the child can be transformed into one concept of 'ready to do.' The teacher infers from the 'doing' the state of 'readiness' of the child as it is revealed in his present activity and as this state adumbrates future 'doing.'

We can briefly note in passing a point which will be developed later. In the same way as the child's reading releases the child from the teacher and socialises him into the privatised solitary learning of an explicit anonymous past (i.e. the textbook), so busy children (children doing) release the child from the teacher but socialise him into an ongoing interactional present in which the past is invisible and so implicit (i.e. the teachers' pedagogical theory). Thus a non-doing child in the invisible pedagogy is the equivalent of a non-reading child in the visible pedagogy. (However, a non-reading child may be at a greater disadvantage and experience greater difficulty than a 'non-doing' child.)

The concept basic to the invisible pedagogy